gaged in some form of extrajudicial political behavior...." These activities have included advising presidents, suggesting legislation to Congress, proposing appointments, participating in diplomatic missions, writing articles, delivering speeches, and sitting on official government tribunals. Why, then, did the Brandeis and Frankfurter activities attract such attention?
One reason is that both were unusually active in promoting their policy concerns off the bench. They undoubtedly breached the concept of judicial noninvolvement in politics as much as any Justice has ever done, at least in this century. But there were two additional factors that seemed to make their story unique. One was the fact that Brandeis largely carried on his policy activities in a sub rosa fashion through a younger operative, Felix Frankfurter, who himself later became a Supreme Court justice and continued the Brandeis practice of "meddling" in public affairs. Second was the fact, which few had previously known, that Brandeis had paid Frankfurter up to $3,500 a year to reimburse him for time spent in pro bono activities. 7 It was this smell of money that was partly responsible for the attention paid the book on publication."
As a Boston lawyer Brandeis' dedication to many liberal causes had made him anathema in the utility, industrial, and financial worlds. 9 During President Wilson's first term he was the President's chief adviser on industrial and financial matters, and influenced a number of key appointments. After surviving the bitter Senate fight on his appointment to the Court in 1916, Justice Brandeis faced a dilemma. His first reaction was to drop all his outside activities, but he soon found such isolation unendurable. He resolved his dilemma by recruiting the dynamic young friend whom he had known since 1911, and who in 1914 had become a professor at Harvard Law School, to act as his eyes and ears, and to promote the policies to which both were committed.
Despite the availability of Frankfurter as an intermediary, however, Brandeis carried on many activities directly. He had contacts throughout the Wilson administration and at the top level 6 B. MuRPHY, ThE BtnDEiS/FRANKF-RTE CONNECTION 7 (1982 16 During this period Brandeis was also using all his administrative contacts to further the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine; "few men had more impact on the creation of the state of Palestine." 1 Yet in spite of all his war-related activities, Brandeis wrote virtually the same number of opinions for the Court during each of the war years as he did later on. .
In the postwar period, the Sacco-Vanzetti case created a cruel challenge for Brandeis.' 8 Behind the scenes he encouraged Frankfurter to argue the case for them in print, but later when their attorneys petitioned him to stay their execution, he avoided any ethical question by disqualifying himself. When liberals criticized Brandeis for refusing to intervene, Frankfurter arranged for an explanation and defense of Brandeis' action to be published in The New Republic. Brandeis had a strong interest in this journal, with which Frankfurter was closely connected, and often gave Frankfurter suggestions for articles, which the latter would then present to the editors as his own ideas. Brandeis would also send In the meantime, Frankfurter was busy placing his Harvard students in key positions in Washington. The famous pair of Thomas Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen were drafting legislation for reform of the stock market and investment practices, and they got many of their ideas from Brandeis through a circular route of intermediaries. 2 4 Through dinners and weekly teas Brandeis kept in touch with everything that was going on. 25 Through Frankfurter he was an active force in development of unemployment insurance legislation, though he was unhappy with the compromise eventually written into the 1935 act. 29 But it was Roosevet's "Court-packing plan" that brought about the destruction of Brandeis' standing with the President and also substantially terminated the Brandeis-Frankfurter connection. 0 At the age of 80, the oldest member of the Court, Brandeis particularly resented Roosevelt's charge that the Court was behind in its work and needed "new and younger blood." As usual, he worked through an intermediary, suggesting to Senator Burton K. Wheeler that he ask Chief Justice Hughes to answer the charge of judicial inefficiency. In the resulting letter, which Wheeler used most effectively against the plan, Hughes specifically noted that in writing it he had consulted his colleagues Brandeis and VanDevanter. While Frankfurter had taken no public position on the Courtpacking plan and was personally ambivalent about it, he resented Brandeis' action and subsequent relations between them were strained. 1 Brandeis retired on February 13, 1939, two weeks after Frankfurter had joined the Court as successor to the late Justice Benjamin Cardozo.
The "Brandeis-Frankfurter connection" ends here, but Murphy proceeds through another 150 pages to detail the extrajudicial activities of Justice Frankfurter, which were easily as spectacular as those of his mentor. But the author concludes that Frankfurter was somewhat more troubled about the ethics of his off-the-bench role than Brandeis had been. 3 2 He made repeated public protestations of his judicial purity, while accommodating his political activities by developing a kind of split personality, a "double Felix."
While the private Felix became in his own time on the bench one of the all-time leaders in political involvement by a Supreme Court justice, the public Felix went to incredible lengths to present just the opposite image. He continually denied his own involvement in activities in which he was deeply involved, set stiff standards for the behavior of others, and, even while violating these standards himself, severely criticized those who failed to observe them. 33 William 0. Douglas was his particular target. which he thinks were "far more intense than the latter's actions warranted." 34 He even speculates that Frankfurter, who as a naturalized citizen was not eligible for the presidency, resented talk about Douglas for president.
Murphy was puzzled, in interviewing some former Frankfurter clerks, to find that they were almost completely unaware of his political contacts, which were especially intense during the wartime period. He believes that the Justice maintained a separation between his political and judicial worlds in part by an ingenious arrangement of his three-office suite. 3 5 Instead of installing himself in the luxurious inner office, designed for the judicial occupant with a fireplace and shower facilities, he gave that office to his law clerk (there was only one at that time) and took the smaller middle office for himself. Consequently visitors could come in through the outer reception area unnoticed by the law clerk. Murphy believes that from his book some of Frankfurter's law clerks will learn for the first time how fully the Justice compartmentalized the two sides of his personality "in a careful use of two distinct sets of lieutenants." 81
Only a sampling of Frankfurter's operations can be given. For example, he found out about the super-secret Manhattan Project, and enlisted Niels Bohr to join him in a direct but unsuccessful effort to get Roosevelt and Churchill interested in the international control of nuclear weapons. 3 7 He gave Secretary Stimson an advisory opinion that the proposed "destroyer-for-bases deal" with Britain was constitutional. What conclusions can be reached on the basis of this revealing study? First, the financial arrangements between Brandeis and Frankfurter seem of minor importance. On an academic salary and wiih his wife's medical expenses, Frankfurter needed assistance if he was to be Brandeis' pro bono aide and give up other opportunities for professional remuneration. The serious question is whether the two justices violated any judicial norms or expectations.
As already noted, there has been a long record of extrajudicial operations and contacts of various sorts by the justices. Murphy supplies a very convenient "Survey of Justices in Politics from 1789 to 1916" in an appendix. 43 Moreover, the early service of both Justices was during wartime, when they would have felt patriotic pressures to promote the war effort. Murphy suggests that their activities were "not much different in kind from the endeavors of other justices, such as Joseph Story in the War of 1812 [and] John A. Campbell and Samuel Nelson in the Civil War ... 44 But there were differences in degree of political involvement that do distinguish the pair from the great majority of their brethren. And though neither could properly be credited with a "judicial temperament," they were otherwise dissimilar. Murphy sees Brandeis as "a visionary prophet," a "reserved ascetic," issuing his prophecies from a distance and waiting for others to secure their adoption. 45 Frankfurter was the opposite-a teacher, a political man, "an incessant meddler: aggressive, bold, and relentless in pursuit of each small tactical victory." 43 It is significant that both Brandeis and Frankfurter felt under an obligation to conceal the extent and nature of their extrajudicial activities. They ran the risk of having to sit as judges on policies or legislation on which they had earlier consulted. 
U.S. 1 (1936).

